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SECURITIES REGULATION—AN SEC-MANDATED ASSET 
VERIFICATION SYSTEM FOR UNACCREDITED INVESTORS 
MUST BE ADDED TO THE PROPOSED REGULATORY 
REGIME UNDER TITLE III OF THE JOBS ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
Under traditional startup fundraising models, businesses in their infancy 
typically obtain financial support from a handful of seasoned investors capable 
of contributing millions.1 Crowdfunding stands in diametric opposition to this 
tradition.2 Put simply, crowdfunding is an emerging fundraising technique that 
generates capital by seeking smaller individual contributions from a larger 
number of people.3 Crowdfunding democratizes an entrepreneur’s access point 
to the capital market by empowering the masses to financially contribute to 
ideas that they find intriguing.4 A recent addition to the JOBS Act is set to take 
crowdfunding, once perceived as the avant-garde cousin5 of traditional equity 
fundraising, and place it directly at the forefront of a revolution in small-
business financing.6 
 
 1 See, e.g., J.J. Colao, Fred Wilson, The Death of Venture Capital, FORBES (May 8, 2012, 12:47 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/05/08/fred-wilson-and-the-death-of-venture-capital/. 
 2 John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act’s Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and Start-Up Company 
Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 357, 366 (2013). 
 3 C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2012). 
 4 John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture 
Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 594 (2013); Chance Barnett, JOBS Act 
Title III: Investment Being Democratized, Moving Online, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013, 9:29 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/10/23/sec-jobs-act-title-iii-investment-being-democratized-
moving-online/.  
 5 Shekhar Darke, Note, To Be or Not to Be a Funding Portal: Why Crowdfunding Platforms will 
Become Broker-Dealers, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 183, 183 (2014) (noting that the previous use of crowdfunding 
was mainly to fund artistic endeavors and social projects); see also Crowdfunding, Exchange Act Release Nos. 
33-9470; 34-70741 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Release] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 
227, 232, 239, 240, 249) (noting the prevalent use of crowdfunding to raise money for artistic endeavors, 
films, and music recordings). 
 6 Bradford, supra note 3. 
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On October 23, 2013, the crowdfunding landscape changed dramatically.7 
After more than fifteen months of delays, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission issued its formal proposal of Title III to the JOBS Act.8 Once 
enacted, Title III will lift the ban on general solicitation for securities 
purchases, allowing emerging growth companies9 to advertise their fundraising 
endeavors and engage in equity crowdfunding in an open market for the first 
time in more than eighty years.10 
The ban was to be lifted in two parts, first with Title II, and second with 
Title III. Title II of the JOBS Act allowed emerging growth companies to 
advertise and solicit investments from accredited investors.11 The SEC strictly 
regulates which entities can call themselves an “accredited investor,” and 
reserves the category only for institutions such as banks, insurance companies 
and registered investment companies, as well as individuals with a net worth of 
more than $1 million, or an annual income above $200,000.00.12 Once fully 
implemented, Title III of the JOBS Act will open the market further by 
allowing general solicitation of investments from the public at large. Anyone 
with access to a computer will now also have access to registered funding 
portals where they can request and receive capital.13 The most optimistic 
proponents of Title III estimate that it will unleash a new wave of capital into 
the U.S. investing market to the tune of $300 billion.14 
I. REGULATIONS TO PREVENT FRAUD ON THE MARKET 
There is a well-established body of scholarship that has voiced concerns 
over protecting unsophisticated investors from potential fraud in equity 
 
 7 Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting Regarding 
Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539996703#.UoMwN7QTtO0.  
 8 Barnett, supra note 4. 
 9 H.R. Res. 3606, 112th Cong. § 101(d) (2012) (creating a statutory definition for “emerging growth 
company”). 
 10 Patrick Clark, Selling Shares Through Crowdfunding Inches Closer to Reality, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-23/selling-shares-through-
crowdfunding-inches-closer-to-reality. 
 11 Barnett, supra note 4. 
 12 Kristen McNamara, Definition of “Sophisticated Investor” Varies, MARKET WATCH (Apr. 26, 2010, 
7:40 AM) http://www.marketwatch.com/story/definition-of-sophisticated-investor-varies-2010-04-26. 
 13 See Barnett, supra note 4.  
 14 Id. 
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crowdfunding.15 The Securities and Exchange Commission no doubt shares 
these concerns, as the vast majority of the 568-page proposed Title III 
regulation deals with reporting and disclosure requirements aimed at 
minimizing the prevalence of fraud on the market.16 
One key regulatory proposal to Title III of the JOBS Act addresses control 
over how much each unaccredited investor may invest in a twelve-month 
window. These investment caps are rooted in a bifurcated system based on net 
worth.17 An individual with a net worth of less than $100,000.00 may not 
contribute more than the greater of $2,000.00 or five percent of annual 
income.18 Individuals with a net worth greater than $100,000.00 may 
contribute 10% of their annual income so long as the total contribution does 
not exceed $100,000.00 in a twelve-month period.19 
II. THE PROPOSED REGULATION’S DEFICIENCY 
As currently written, the income-cap regulations for potential investors lack 
teeth. Nowhere in the regulation is there a provision that requires 
crowdfunding platforms to verify the income or assets of unaccredited 
investors. The system is based entirely on unchecked self-reporting by 
unsophisticated investors.20 There is nothing that prevents an investor from 
lying about their assets, or making common mistakes in their calculation, such 
as including the value of their home in their net worth.21 This creates a 
troublesome scenario for the future of crowdfunding. The current scholarly 
discussion seems to be exclusively focused on protecting the unaccredited 
investors from the emerging growth company. This one-sided focus begs the 
question: should the Securities and Exchange Commission also be concerned 
about protecting unaccredited investors from themselves? 
 
 15 See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 
N.C.L. REV. 1735, 1744 (2012); Wroldsen, supra note 4, at 594 ; David Mashburn, Comment, The Anti-Crowd 
Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s Hidden Risk and Inadequate Remedies, 63 EMORY L.J. 127, 134  (2013). 
 16 See SEC Release at 10. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Kathleen Pender, SEC Issues Long-Awaited Equity Crowdfunding Rules, SF GATE (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:41 
PM) http://blog.sfgate.com/pender/2013/10/23/sec-issues-long-awaited-equity-crowdfunding-rules/. 
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III.  THE NEED FOR SEC-MANDATED ASSET VERIFICATION FOR 
UNACCREDITED INVESTORS 
By failing to create an asset verification process for unaccredited investors, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission has created a strange dichotomy in 
its regulatory regime. When the first wave of solicitation restrictions was lifted 
under Title II of the JOBS Act, the SEC raised the level of diligence for 
companies when verifying the status of purchasers as accredited investors.22 
Accompanying Title II of the JOBS Act was a newly-amended Rule 506(c), 
which requires companies to verify the assets of an accredited investor.23 The 
new rule states that, “the issuer shall take reasonable steps to verify that 
purchasers of securities sold in any offering under paragraph (c) of this section 
are accredited investors.”24 The Securities and Exchange Commission even 
goes as far as to provide a list of suggested methods to perform this 
verification.25 To verify assets, the SEC suggests verifying bank statements, 
brokerage statements, statements of other securities holdings, certificates of 
deposit, tax assessments, and appraisal reports issued by independent third 
parties.26 For liabilities, the commission suggests reviewing a consumer report 
from at least one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies.27 
If the Securities and Exchange Commission would stiffen the equity 
crowdfunding company’s requirement to verify the assets and liabilities of 
accredited investors, who, according to the commission’s own definition, have 
enough knowledge and experience in business matters to evaluate the risks and 
merits of an investment,28 why would they not do the same for unsophisticated 
investors? 
Drafting a rule that restricts the ability of an investor with less than 
$100,000.00 in net worth to participate in equity crowdfunding is unavailing if 
not accompanied by subsequent verification of their net worth. If no one is 
there to correct an investor’s false or mistaken claim that his or her net worth is 
 
 22 Legal Insight by Gary J. Kocher, Reasonable Steps to Verify Third Party Certification Procedure 
Designed to Comply with New SEC Rules Permitting General Solicitation in Reg D Private Offerings, K&L 
GATES, (Oct. 9, 2013) http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/6c31add1-8cfb-4667-ba2c-
0ef7583ca48b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e9477896-668a-4e4d-822e-
11e6f5c8399f/Client_Alert_10092013.pdf. 
 23 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id.  
 28 McNamara, supra note 12. 
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greater than $100,000.00, the regulation is self-defeating. The absence of an 
asset verification provision in the Title III regulation creates a perfect storm of 
factors which will allow everyday consumers to overextend their finances on 
junk-investments.29 Flashy marketing and creative sales pitches could quite 
easily lure “grandma” away from her Facebook page and into a platform where 
she can “bet the farm” on a startup company that has between a 50%-75% 
chance of failing within five years.30 
Because there is no marketplace incentive for the verification of 
unaccredited investors assets, the regulation must come from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The crowdfunding process relies almost exclusively on 
third-party intermediaries such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter. The vast majority 
of these intermediaries make their money by charging a commission fee, which 
can range anywhere from 2.9% to 9% of the total funds raised.31 The incentive 
for these websites is to serve their clients by raising as much money from as 
many people as possible, regardless of whether the investors can afford their 
contributions. The companies themselves also have a natural incentive to raise 
as much capital as possible. The requirement to verify unaccredited investor 
income must be codified by the Securities and Exchange Commissions, or else 
it simply will not happen. 
There is no need to speculate on the problems that can arise from allowing 
consumers to make major investments without verifying their assets. All the 
Securities and Exchange Commission needs to do is look back to the home 
mortgage crisis. In the period before the market crash, banks made it a routine 
practice to give loans to high-risk borrowers.32 Many only ever asked the 
borrower to state his or her annual income without presenting any 
documentation.33 The consequences were disastrous for both the mortgage-
backed securities market, and the economy at large. A forensic reconstruction 
of the market crash reveals that the collapse was fueled by greed on both sides 
 
 29 Mashburn, supra note 15, at 13‒16. 
 30 See SEC Release, supra note 11, at 157 n. 393 (citing a study by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration which states half of all new businesses fail within five years, and a study by Wall Street 
Journal finding that out of nearly 2,000 companies that received at least $1 million in venture funding, almost 
three-quarters of these companies failed). 
 31 See Alvaris Falcon, 10 Crowdfunding Sites To Fuel Your Dream Project, HONGKIAT, 
http://www.hongkiat.com/blog/crowdfunding-sites/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).  
 32 Steven Pearlstein, ‘No Money Down’ Falls Flat, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031301733.html. 
 33 Id.  
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of the table.34 Where assets and income went unchecked, millions of borrowers 
chased their dream home by entering into mortgage contracts they simply 
could not afford.35 Lenders were all too eager to make and securitize those 
loans.36 This greed is the link between the home mortgage crisis and the 
deficiency in the newly announced regulations to Title III. 
When the Securities and Exchange Commission officially opens the door 
for the common man to participate in equity crowdfunding, that same two-way 
street of greed will be present in the market for capital.37 Thirsty startup 
companies will be eager to drink as much as they can from the crowdfunding 
fountain.38 Unaccredited investors, unwitting as they might be, will be eager to 
invest their money through crowdfunding platforms in hopes that they may win 
the startup lottery.39 The Securities and Exchange Commission must 
implement some sort of process to verify the assets of unaccredited investors 
so that these individuals do not financially overextend themselves on startup 
businesses, the majority of which will fail.40 
HARRISON JONES∗ 
 
 34 See Eli Lehrer & George Benston, Subprime Borrowers: Not Innocents, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
http://businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2008/03/subprime_borro 
wers_not_innocents.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014); Ryan Barnes, The Fuel That Fed the Subprime 
Meltdown, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 26, 2009) http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprime-overview.asp. 
 35 Lehrer, supra note 34. 
 36 See Pearlstein, supra note 32.  
 37 William T. Smith, Risk, The Spirit of Capitalism and Growth: The Implications of a Preference for 
Capital, 21 J. MACROECON. 241, 241 (1999) (stating that the desire for accumulation of wealth is at the core of 
the spirit of capitalism, and is thought to be the driving force behind economic growth). 
 38 See Wroldsen, supra note 2, at 366.  
 39 Id. at 585‒86 (stating that nearly three thousand investors have already pledged to donate $7.5 million 
when equity crowdfunding becomes fully legal). 
 40 Pender, supra note 21.  
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